Popular Holdings – FY12 (Apr) Results

All the data are extracted from the results (please counter-check in case of error),

   

FY08

FY09

FY10

FY11

Q112

Q212

Q312

Q412

FY12

Revenue

434,995

450,317

514,648

522,440

141,633

118,593

166,453

140,573

567,252

Gross Profit

66,635

64,236

74,699

83,342

26,919

18,922

33,598

22,705

102,144

Operating Profit

16,511

-19,612

40,320

31,030

12,613

5,295

15,090

2,694

35,692

PBT

16,689

-18,967

40,076

31,497

12,775

5507

15,192

2,953

36,427

Net Profit

13,401

-17,509

31,200

23,830

10,237

4086

12,235

4,762

31,320

NPM

3.08%

NA

6.06%

4.56%

7.23%

3.45%

7.35%

3.39%

5.52%

Cash

48,907

71,501

90,017

104,797

120,035

114,488

129,331

145,945

145,945

Properties (For Sale)

39,032

23,320

20,400

15,287

15,288

15,288

Development Properties

84,450

76,561

82,507

37,526

38,659

40,082

64,270

67,135

67,135

Loan – CL

16,400

50,408

11,156

5,008

779

759

764

14,431

14,431

Loan – NCL

53,073

17,104

17,013

14,307

14,799

15,284

28,978

17,563

17,563

NAV (ct)

30.13

20.74

21.45

22.68

23.66

23.69

24.73

25.09

25.09

EPS (ct)

2.99

-3.53

4.53

2.83

1.22

0.48

1.44

3.70

3.70

DPS (ct)

0.5 + 0.7

0.5 + 0.2

(0.5 + 0.5) + 0.2

0.4 + 0.6

0.5

0.8

0.5 + 0.8

Remarks

Jan-09 : Rights Issue ($19.7M) 1-for-2 @ $0.10

Feb-10 : Rights Issue ($25.333M) 3-for-10 @ $0.13

Notes :

  • All figures in S$’000 unless otherwise stated
  • FY is End-Apr

 

SEGMENTS – Geographical

  

Singapore 

Malaysia 

Greater China 

Others 

Turnover 

Outlets 

FY12 

258,940

212,690 

93,014 

2,608 

567,252 

148 

FY11 

253,332 

164,577 

101,205 

3,326 

522,440 

139 

FY10 

264,414 

144,240 

105,133 

861 

514,648 

133 

FY09 

216,304 

130,538 

101,340 

2,135 

450,317 

133 

FY08 

200,723 

125,441 

106,342 

2,489 

434,995 

129 

FY07 

179,968 

107,650 

109,288

1,329 

396,235 

117 

 

SEGMENTS – Business

  

  

Retail & Distribution 

Publishing / e-Learning 

Property Development 

Corporate 

Eliminations 

Consolidated 

2012

Margin

6.04% 

10.11% 

12.44% 

24.24% 

 

6.42% 

Revenue 

482,321 

72,054 

29,577 

11,964 

-28,664 

567,252

Ext 

367 

16,333 

29,577 

     

Inter-Segment 

481,954 

55,721 

 

11,964 

-28,664 

 

P/L (Ops)

29,132 

7,283 

3,680 

2,900 

 

36,427 

2011

Margin

4.36% 

14.03% 

26.63% 

27.63% 

 

6.03% 

Revenue 

438,788 

68,977 

27,772 

13,292 

-26,389 

522,440 

Ext 

438,624 

56,044 

27,772 

     

Inter-Segment 

164 

12,933 

 

13,292 

-26,389 

 

P/L (Ops)

19,133 

9,680 

7,397 

3,673 

-8,386 

31,497 

2010

Margin

2.61% 

11.55% 

68.99% 

-102.63% 

 

7.79% 

Revenue 

418,387 

67,553 

41,434 

10,836 

 

514,648 

Ext 

418,201 

55,013 

41,434 

 

-23,562 

 

Inter-Segment 

186 

12,540

 

10,836 

   

P/L (Ops)

10,925 

7,799 

28,586 

-11,121 

3,887 

40,076 

2009

Margin

1.11% 

16.76% 

     

-4.36% 

Revenue 

393,173 

70,830 

   

-13,686 

450,317 

P/L (Ops)

4,354 

11,871 

-29,165 

 

-6,672 

-19,612 

2008

Margin

2.91% 

24.05% 

     

3.80% 

Revenue 

374,495 

73,083 

   

-12,583 

434,995

P/L (Ops)

10,909 

17,575 

-798 

 

-11,175 

16,511 

2007

Margin

4.25% 

8.28% 

     

3.99% 

Revenue 

332,494 

76,990 

   

-11,249 

398,235 

P/L (Ops)

14,116 

6,375 

-111 

 

-4,479 

15,901 

2006

Margin

4.03% 

12.12% 

     

5.73% 

Revenue 

314,116 

80,649 

   

-10,978 

383,787 

P/L (Ops)

12,663 

9,771 

   

-462 

21,972

2005

Margin

3.78%

6.92%

     

4.27%

Revenue 

299,005 

71,234 

   

-10,133 

360,106 

P/L (Ops)

11,293 

4,929 

   

-842 

15,380 

2004

Margin

4.01%

13.00%

     

5.59%

Revenue 

288,792 

67,602 

   

-8,963 

347,431 

P/L (Ops)

11,572 

8,791 

   

-935 

19,428 

2003

Margin

2.90%

15.14%

     

5.18%

Revenue 

269,932 

66,573 

   

-8,140 

328,365 

P/L (Ops)

7,816 

10,078 

   

-872

17,022 

 


 

2 Comments to Popular Holdings – FY12 (Apr) Results

  1. KK says:

    Extracts from FY11 (Last Year) AR which is still relevant,

    POPULAR is still strong in its core businesses. Amidst an uncertain but a recovering global economy, our retail and distribution was the star performer, achieving 75% increase in profits from S$10.9 million to S$19.1 million. With 14 new outlets opened, the total number of outlets reached 139 compared to 133 in FY2010. Turnover grew by 5% from S$418.4 million to S$438.8 million in FY2011.

    POPULAR in Malaysia achieved double digit growth for its retail and distribution. With 65 stores, the search for new stores and the business expansion should continue unabated for quite a while. The bottom line should look attractive through gross margin improvement, prudent spending and strong growth in both generic and organic sales. The challenge is to recruit adequate and appropriate manpower by thinking out of the box and developing strategies in recruitment. We have to understand the mentality of the new Generation Y and to manage them within the context of POPULAR, planning career paths to develop staff at all levels.

    POPULAR in Singapore could not just depend on a well-recognized brand. Though its new outlets at NEX, a new mega-mall in Serangoon Central and another in Clementi Mall are bringing in exciting sales, it has to make a breakthrough in order to rise. Looking at the book retailing scene in Singapore, everyone faces the same situation.

  2. KK says:

    The latest buy transaction by Mr Chou on 18-Jul-12 @ $0.218 for 1,929,000 shares set me thinking on what his possible reason or intention may be. Since he already has 56.67% control, it can't possibly be the fear of being taken over by an unfriendly 3rd party.

    My previous reasoning is that Mr Chou MAY be buying because Popular Hldgs is Undervalued at current prices. Reasoning,

    • Cash = 17.35ct / share

    So, we are effectively valuing the rest of the biz at only,

    • Books + Property = 21.5ct – 17.35ct = 4.15ct.

    Although there're some debts,

    • Total Debts = $16,523,000 (NCL) + $14,431,000 (CL) = $30,954,000

    There're also assets like,

    • Properties Held for Sale = $15.288,000
    • Development Properties = $67,135,000
    • Total = $82,423,000

    That's easily more than the Total Debts.

     

    A Possible New Reason

    • Total Shares = 841,105,755
    • Mr Chou = 476,690,075 shares
    • Balance = 364,415,680 shares

    Assuming Mr Chou offers to privatise Popular Hldgs @ $0.276 (a 10% premium over NAV = 25.09ct), he'll need to borrow from the bank (it doesn't make much biz sense to use Cash, even if he has that amount),

    • Borrowings = 364,415,680 * $0.276 = $100,575,083

    Once he has 100% control, he can use,

    • Popular Holdings Cash = $145,945,000

    to repay his entire borrowings (for simplicity, I didn't add in any borrowing cost) and still have,

    • Popular Hldgs Cash Balance = $145,945,000 – $100,575,083 = $45,369,916

    That ought to be enough for his Working Capital needs. If not enough, I don't see any problem to borrow more from the banks as Popular Hldgs is not highly geared.

    Makes sense? Without coming out with a single cent from his own pocket (borrow all from bank), Mr Chou can have 100% control of Popular Hldgs! NAV of course drops but may be secondary as there's enough Cash to continue running the biz and he gets to enjoy 100% profits henceforth! Also, no need to answer to any shareholder…

    Is it worthwhile to continue to stay listed?

    If I'm right, then it makes a lot of sense for Mr Chou to continue buying from the market at current prices. The more he buys now from the open market, the less in total absolute premium he'll have to pay later (if he does do a General Offer).

    If an Offer were to materialise soon, it'll most likely be conditional on the latest DPU = 0.8ct payout, as it'll save Mr Chou $6.73Mil from Popular's Cash or $2.916M if exclude his share of Div Payout. BUT, if he's able to 'save' more $$ by buying more from the open market (at a good discount' to any bid), then, there won't be any urgency to launch an offer.

    Another key motivation to privatise would be for Mr Chou to have more flexibility to hand over management to his son (Wayne Chou), who'd previously resigned as MD under unhappy circumstances. As a private company, there'd be no need to be answerable to shareholders..

    Note : I'm using a 10% premium to NAV which may seem high to Mr Chou. If he uses less and still succeed, there'll be more leftover cash balance in Popular Hldgs. A higher premium would of course means lesser cash (will need to increase borrowings for Working Capital needs) and may hit a point where it's not meaningful to privatise.

    Where's Mr Wayne Chou?

     

    WARNING : Lest we get overly optimistic, please do remember that one of the KEY RISK of Popular Hldgs is the LOW NPM (Nett Profit Margin) of 3% to 6%. Any Declining Revenue, Increasing Expenses or Write-Offs can easily swing it to a Nett Loss.

     

     

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